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Patient Choice in Acute Care
Abstract—Consumer healthcare information plays a critical
role in informing patients who participate in or make healthcare
decisions for themselves without direct supervision of a healthcare
professional. One such example is the choice of facility for
acute care, prototypically between a fully equipped emergency
care department (ED) at a hospital and a more convenient
but less capable urgent care (UC) or retail clinic. We model
a strategic patient making this decision taking into account the
limited medical information and convenience factors that affect
the patient’s decision. This model is then used to inform the
pricing decision made by the manager of the UC. We show that
a separating equilibrium, in which all patients self-triaged as non-
critical choose to go to the UC first, dominates pooling equilibria
for moderate error rates in self-triage. We analyze the separating
equilibrium to examine the effect of consumer health information
(CHI) systems, and show that as the quality of the CHI decreases
and the error rates go up, the co-pay for an UC decreases, the
facility is smaller, and makes less profit.
Keywords-consumer health information systems, classification
error, Nash equilibrium, emergency room, urgent care
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1980s in the US, some patients needing acute
care, i.e., those needing short-term treatment for an injury, an
episode of illness, or an urgent medical condition, have had
a choice between a full fledged Emergency Department in a
hospital and an Urgent Care facility that “delivers ambulatory
medical care outside of a hospital emergency department on
a walk-in basis, without a scheduled appointment1.” The ED
remains the most comprehensive acute care treatment facility,
dealing with cases that require immediate care to non-urgent
cases. UC centers typically only provide non-emergent care. In
Table I we show the difference in the levels of care provided
by EDs and UCs.
Urgent Care Centers have grown tremendously in popularity
for providing acute care for non-emergent cases, i.e., for cases
in levels 4 and 5 of Emergency Severity Index. The number
of urgent care centers has grown from approximately 8,000 in
2008 to 9,300 in 2014, with 4 or more urgent care centers in
cities with population of 100,000 or more2.
Part of the reason for the rise of UC has been the congestion
and wait times at emergency departments. Even as the patient
demand for acute care has been increasing, the number of EDs
has been decreasing in the U.S. (4). The net effect is that the
wait times have been increasing explosively. US Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) reports that between 2003 and 2009,
the mean wait time to see a provider increased by 25% to
1This definition and the statistics on Urgent Care centers in this and the next
paragraph come from the industry trade association - Urgent Care Association
of America (UCAOA). See especially their results from a survey in 2013 (1)
2Ibid.
Emergency
Severity
Index
Example of Condi-
tion
Percent Providers
(2) (3)
Level 1 - Im-
mediate
resuscitation, cardiac
arrest, critically in-
jured trauma patient
1.2% ED only
Level 2 -
Emergent
suicidal or homicidal
patient, chemotherapy
patient with fever, ac-
tive chest pain
10.7% ED only
Level 3 - Ur-
gent
fractured ankle,
abdominal pain,
migraine
42.3% ED and a
few UC
Level 4 -
Semi-urgent
sore throat and fever,
stubbed toe, sprained
ankle, minor lacera-
tion
35.5% ED and UC
Level 5 -
Nonurgent
poison ivy, toothache 8.0% ED and UC
TABLE I: Levels of Care
almost an hour (5). The wait times are even worse for patients
with non-emergent conditions. These patients, who make up a
significant proportion of patients at an ED, 43% in the US in
2011 (3), are triaged into lower priority queues that have even
longer wait times. These patients can be treated elsewhere such
as in an UC (6) where the wait times are much lower. The
wait time distribution at EDs and UCs are shown in Tables
II and III. We note that only 3% of patients at an UC waited
more than 40 minutes whereas 21.6% of the patients and ED
waited an hour or more. Average wait times at each ED in
US is available publicly, for instance at ER Wait Watcher3
which provides the average delay and travel time to nearby
EDs from any address in US. A screen-shot is shown in Figure
1. Shifting some non-emergent patients from the ED to the
UC can help all patients, but especially those who have non-
emergent conditions.
While most Emergency Departments are affiliated with
hospitals and are typically located in urban environments,
Urgent Care centers are located in suburbs and in locations
convenient for patients. The most common location for an UC
is a shopping strip or a mall4.
The co-payments and fees charged by UCs are typically
3Published by Pro Publica at projects.propublica.org/emergency/ It uses
annual wait time data gathered by Medicare
4According to a recent survey by the Urgent Care Association of America
(UCAOA), the largest proportion, 38% of Urgent care centers are located in
a shopping center or strip mall.
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Time to see a professional % of visits
Fewer than 15 minutes 27.0%
15-59 minutes 40.7%
1 to 2 hours 13.5%
2 to 3 hours 4.8%
3 to 4 hours 1.6%
4 to 6 hours 1.0%
6 hours or more 0.7%
TABLE II: Wait times at emergency departments
Source: US Center for Disease Control (3). Values do not ad up to 100% because of
blank (7.5%) and not applicable (3.1%) data, and rounding.
Time to see a professional % of visits
Fewer than 20 minutes 69%
21-40 minutes 28%
40 minutes or more 3%
TABLE III: Wait time at urgent care centers
Source: Urgent Care Association of America Foundation (7) http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/
www.ucaoa.org/resource/resmgr/Files/UrgentCareMediaKit 2013.pdf
much lower than that charged by an ED. Consumer Reports
in their April 2009 Health Report (8) reported that the co-
pays and fees for UCs are comparable to that for a doctor
visit, about $120 on average, and much lower than at an ED,
$400 on average.
While UCs are more convenient and cheaper overall for non-
emergent care, EDs still get non-emergent patients for a variety
of reasons. Ability to pay is one reason. UCs only accept
patients who have insurance or are willing to pay themselves.
They do not accept medically indigent patients. These patients
go to an ED which is required by law to accept them5. Another
reason is availability. UCs are typically open during business
hours from 8AM to 10PM, whereas the ED is open 24 hours a
day. Yet another reason is mis-classification by the patient who
thinks that she has an emergent condition but actually does not.
We consider the quality of self-classification in greater detail
below.
Patients requiring immediate treatment for extremely emer-
gent conditions are often transported directly by ambulance
services to the ED. From Table I we note that this makes up
only about 1% of the patients at a typical ED. Other patients
who have insurance coverage or are willing to pay for urgent
care have a choice.
So how does a patient choose an acute care facility? The
health insurance companies have a strong financial interest in
making their insured patients aware of the UC option because
it is much cheaper for them. Using the 2008 Medical Expen-
ditures Panel Survey (MEPS), the Government Accountability
Office reports that the average charge for a non-emergency
5In 1986 the US enacted a law ‘Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA)’ that requires hospitals accepting Medicare payments
to provide emergency care treatment irrespective of ability to pay or legal
status.
Fig. 1: Wait and travel times to near by Emergency
Departments provided by ER Wait Watcher
http://projects.propublica.org/emergency/
visit to an ED is $2,101 versus $203 at a health care center (9).
Many of the health insurance companies maintain websites and
use other channels including mailings to inform the insureds of
the UC option (10, 11). For instance, the health care insurance
company Aetna Inc. reports that the average co-payment and
out of pocket costs for sprains, influenza, minor lacerations
and headaches (migraine and tension) is $550 to $750 in
ED and $110 to $150 in UC (10) and that their patients can
save money by choosing to go to an UC. Additionally, many
potential patients go by Urgent Care centers in their usual day
to day activities since many UC are located in malls, and other
popular places.
The hard part in picking between an ED and an UC is
deciding whether the patient’s condition is emergent or not
since UCs do not offer care for patients with emergent condi-
tions (Emergency Severity Index 1 to 3). This is because the
judgment is made by the patient or her family who typically
are not medically trained. Again, most insurance companies
and hospitals provide guidelines as a part of their consumer
health information (CHI) initiative. An example is provided in
Figure 2. Most insurance companies have similar CHI.
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Urgent Care Guidelines
Urgent Care treatment is best for these types of injuries:
Head: No loss of consciousness, cuts less than one inch
Ears: Earaches, infection, foreign object, severe dizziness or drainage
Eyes: Scrapes, bruises, infections or a sty, objects in the eye, swelling around the eye
Nose: Infection
Throat: Sore throat
Chest: Cough with or without fever, moderate asthma
Abdomen: Persistent nausea and/or vomiting
Genital/Urinary: Frequent trips to the bathroom, burning/pain with urination, vaginal/ penis discharge, bleeding or
discomfort with intercourse
Back: Minor strains or backache
Limbs/Skin: Sprains without deformity, shallow or short cuts, stitch removal, puncture wounds to hands or feet, minor
scrapes or burns, rash, insect or animal bites
Why you should choose Urgent Care instead of the Emergency Center for the listed conditions:
You may have to wait longer in the Emergency Center, as the most serious injuries/cases are seen first.
Co-pays are often more expensive in the Emergency Center than at Urgent Care.
Your health plan may not pay for care if it is not a true emergency.
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Fig. 2: A simple example for CHI
Source: Mercy Health Cadillac http://www.mercyhealthcadillac.com/
urgent-care-guidelines
S lf-triage into emergent and non-emergent conditions by
he patient or their family is fraught with costly errors. Patients
who go to an ED with non-emergent conditions will have
longer waits and much larger co-pays. Patients who go to
an UC with emergent condition also have serious conse-
quences that include delay of care for a serious life threatening
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condition, extra co-pays, and delay from additional travel. In
this paper we model the self-triage activity as a process of
classification with errors of both kinds. We consider a strategic
patient who weighs all the costs, including waiting, co-pays,
and the that of error in self-triage, in deciding whether to visit
an UC or an ED.
In this paper we focus on the Urgent Care center and its
management. In section (III) we model the behavior of a
patient who is choosing an acute care facility on the basis of
self-triage, expected waiting time and co-payment differences
between ED and UC. We model the UC as a price taker,
taking the price of the ED as a given and setting a discount for
patients over the ED co-payment. We consider two kinds of
patient behavior: separating equilibrium, the strategic patients
who self triage as non-critical go to the UC and those that self-
triage as critical go to the ED; while in the pooling equilibrium
all the strategic patients go to the UC first6. We show that the
separating equilibrium dominates the pooling equilibrium for
moderate error rates.
In section (IV) we analyze the separating equilibrium. We
characterize the discount set by the UC. In this equilibrium,
the optimal discount set by the UC is increasing in both kinds
of error, error in which a non-critical patient mistakenly thinks
that she is critical and goes to the ED directly, and the error
in which a truly critical patient mistakenly self-triages as non-
critical and goes to the UC. Hence, the UC manager has an
incentive to reduce errors.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The cost of waiting in healthcare settings is well doc-
ument in literature. For instance, (12) studied the cost of
increased wait times on society due to inappropriate use of
the emergency department by patients seeking non-emergency
or primary care. (13) mention that commonly studied ef-
fects of crowding included patient mortality, transport delays,
treatment delays, ambulance diversion, patient elopement, and
financial effect.
Models to predict waiting times for patients with differing
priorities, such as between elective and acute care, have been
developed starting the 1970s (12, 14, 15, 16). This situation is
similar to our setting for the emergency department in which
critical patients have priority over non-critical patients. They
find that the proportion of low and high priority patients is an
important determinant of hospital performance.
There is extensive literature on the appointment scheduling
of patients for outpatient and inpatient services. See especially
the review by (17) and more recent papers (18), (19), (20),
(21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (26), (27) and (28). While these
papers shed light on the interaction between appointment
scheduling and wait times, they are not directly relevant to
our study because we examine the acute care setting in which
appointments are not generally made or taken.
6The other pooling equilibrium in which all the patients first go the ED is
not attractive to the UC since typically a patient at an ED does not leave and
go to an UC.
In an interesting variation, (29) study the capacity reserva-
tion for urgent patients in primary care when there are both
urgent and routine (nonurgent) patients. They define urgent
cases as those that need to be seen in the same day as their
request. They note that for some cases the patient’s symptoms
would lead the physician to categorize him as urgent. In other
cases, it is more the patient’ own sense of urgency that drives
the categorization. They allow an urgent patient who cannot
be served on the day of request to be seen the following day
as an overflow. This is not generally acceptable for patients
with extremely urgent cases (ESI 1 to 3, as shown in Table I),
and so we do not see these techniques employed in emergency
rooms.
Few papers model choices by patients. One example is the
paper by (30) in which the choice of a patient includes the
appointment times, e.g., she can choose between the same
day appointment in which different part of the day might be
another choice or an appointment at a later day for a primary
care clinic rather than the choice between medical facilities.
The patient’s choice of facility to go to is exogenous. Our
model focuses on the facility choice.
In our model, the patient is picking between facilities based
on a number of factors. Such strategic behavior by patients has
been documented in literature. (31) note that patients, armed
with information from the web, are increasingly involved
in making healthcare decisions. Further, there is empirical
evidence that the patients strategically weigh the different
factors such as quality of care, waiting times, co-payments,
in deciding what kind of care to get (32, 33). To these factors
we add the cost of errors from self-classification, which itself
is fraught with costly errors.
III. THE MODEL
Patients may or may not have a choice of which acute care
facility to visit, an Emergency Department (ED) at a hospital
or an Urgent Care center (UC), to visit. We label the patients
who have the choice as strategic and those who do not as
non-strategic. Though we include the non-strategic patients in
the workflow to estimate wait times in each facility, we focus
on strategic patients in the rest of this paper.
In this paper we divide the strategic patients into two groups:
One labeled critical , is a group of patients with conditions
with ESI (see Table I) in Levels 1, 2 and 3; and another group
labeled non-critical is a group of patients with conditions
with ESI 4 and 5. Let λ0c and λ0n be the arrival rates of
non-strategic patients who are truly critical and non-critical,
respectively. Similarly let λc and λn be the arrival rates
of strategic patients who are truly critical and non-critical,
respectively. A strategic patient’s choice starts with self-triage
or classification based on perceived symptoms and her prior
medical knowledge including that obtained from consumer
health information (CHI) systems.
The self-triage or classification done by a non-medical
professional is fraught with errors. On the one hand, a patient
who is truly critical, such as a heart attack patient thinking that
the angina is upset stomach, may self-classify as non-critical.
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On the other hand, a patient who is truly non-critical, such as a
patient with an upset stomach thinks that she has appendicitis,
may self classify as critical. In either case, the patient is not
fully informed or trained and may make an error. As we see
from the examples above, two types of errors are possible: (1)
A truly non-critical patient predicts that she is critical (Type
I error) or (2) a truly critical patient predicts that she is non-
critical (Type II error)7. We define α and β as the error rates
for Type I and Type II errors, respectively. Without loss of
generality we take α + β ≤ 1 for if this is not the case then
the labels in the guidelines can be switched to make it so. The
confusion matrix, in Table IV exhibits the disposition of the
patients between true and predicted classes.
Truly Critical Truly Non-critical
Predicts Critical (1− β)λc αλn
Predicts Non-critical βλc (1− α)λn
TABLE IV: Confusion matrix
Patients incur a variety of costs in using the medical facility.
Some costs, such as co-pays, are pecuniary while others, such
as those associated with waiting and transfer, and effects on
outcome because of delays, are non-pecuniary but important
to consider. At the time of arrival patients incur co-pay P
in ED and P − D in UC where D is the discount offered
by UC to patients. Patients who choose to go to UC but are
truly critical incur the rerouting cost R from UC to ED. These
patients incur both co-pays.
Patients who arrive at a facility may wait before they are
treated, and treatment itself may take a while. For separating
equilibrium, we define the expected system waiting times
as Wc and Wn for critical and non-critical patients in ED,
respectively and W for non-critical patients in UC8. We also
assign patient waiting cost rate cc and cn for critical and
non-critical patients, respectively. Putting these together we
determine the expected disutility that are shown in the Table
V below.
Critical Non-critical
Go to ED P + ccWc P + cnWn
Go to UC 2P −D +R+ ccWc P −D + cnW
TABLE V: Expected Cost incurred by a Strategic Patient for
Separating Equilibrium
The UC manager influences the choice of the patients by
setting the discount. Two possible outcomes are analyzed:
7In statistics Type I and Type II errors refer to the false positive and the
false negative errors, respectively. We treat the critical class as the positive
class for purposes of assigning Type I and Type II error names.
8For ease of exposition, here we consider the separating equilibrium. For
pooling equilibrium, the expected system times are W ′c and W ′n for critical
and non-critical patients in ED, respectively and W ′ for non-critical patients
in UC.
1) A Separating Equilibrium in which all the patients
who self-triage as non-critical go to the UC, and all the
patients who self-triage as critical go to the ED9.
2) A Pooling Equilibrium in which all the strategic patients
go first to the UC, and then the critical ones are triaged
to the ED10.
These equilibria are examined in sections (III-A) and
(III-B).
A. The Separating Equilibrium
In this section we explore a separating equilibrium in which
strategic patients who self-triage as non-critical choose to go
to UC instead of the ED. However, because of error in self
triage, only a (1 − α) fraction of non-critical patients go to
the UC. The remainder, αλn, go to the ED thinking they are
critical. Similarly, (1− β)λc of the critical patients go to the
ED directly, and βλc erroneously thinking that they are non-
critical go first to the UC and then are re-routed to the ED.
The care map is shown in the top part of Figure 3.
Including the non-strategic patient flows of λ0c and λ0n for
critical and non-critical condition, the total net flows into the
different facilities are:
Critical patients into ED: λEc = λ0c + λc
Non-critical patients into ED: λEn = λ0n + αλn
Non-critical patients into UC: λU = (1− α)λn.
We also define service rates in both acute care facilities. We
define µ as the service rate for non-critical patients in UC, and
θ and ν as the service rate for critical and non-critical patients
in ED, respectively. Further, we assume that ν > θ, i.e., it
takes longer to provide healthcare service to a critical patient
than a non-critical patient.
A separating equilibrium, in which strategic patients who
are predicted to be non-critical use the UC, is characterized
next. Let C and NC be events where patients are truly
critical and non critical, respectively and C ′ and NC ′ be
the events that they are predicted critical and predicted non-
critical, respectively. Let pi denote the precision of the non-
critical classification, i.e, pi = Pr[NC|NC ′] and pi′ denote the
precision of the critical classification, i.e., pi′ = Pr[C|C ′].
Examining the confusion matrix in Table IV, we get the
precisions for the non-critical and critical classes, respectively,
as follows:
pi =
(1− α)(1− χ)
βχ+ (1− α)(1− χ) and pi
′ =
(1− β)χ
(1− β)χ+ α(1− χ)
where χ = λcλc+λn is the prior probability of critical condition
for strategic patients.
9The other separating equilibrium, in which the patients self-triaged as
critical go to the UC, and those self-triaged non-critical go to the ED is
dominated for the patients by the separating equilibrium examined here.
10The pooling equilibrium in which all the strategic patients go the ED is
dominated for the UC manager by the pooling equilibrium examined above.
Since very few patients ever leave an ED to go to an UC, in the latter case,
the UC would get almost no patients.
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(status unknown) 
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Self Triage 
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truly critical 
non-critical 
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


Separating Equilibrium (predicted critical go to ED, predicted non-critical go to UC 
Triage at ED ED 
Non-strategic 
patients 
All Strategic 
patients 
critical 
non-critical 
Additional cost R 
 criticalc
 non-criticaln
Triage at UC 
Pay P-D 
Pay P 
,c cW c
,n nW c
,U nW c

UC 
0  criticalc
0  non-criticaln



 criticalc
 non-criticaln
Pooling Equilibrium (all strategic patients go to UC) 
𝜆0𝑐 + 𝜆𝑐 
𝜆0𝑛  
Notation:
λc Arrival rate of strategic patients who are
truly critical
λn Arrival rate of strategic patients who are
truly non-critical
λ0c Arrival rate of non-strategic patients who
are truly critical
λ0n Arrival rate of non-strategic patients who
are truly non-critical
α The error rate of patients who are classi-
fied critical but are truly non-critical
β The error rate of patients who are classi-
fied non-critical but are truly critical
P Co-payment for ED services
D Discount in co-payment for UC services
P −D Co-payment net of discount for UC ser-
vices
µ The service rate at UC
θ The service rate for critical patients at ED
ν The service rate for non-critical patients at
ED
W The expected time in system for patients
at UC in separating equilibrium
Wc The expected time in system for critical
patients at ED in separating equilibrium
Wn The expected time in system for non-
critical patients at ED in separating equi-
librium
W ′ The expected time in system for patients
at UC in pooling equilibrium
W ′c The expected time in system for critical
patients at ED in pooling equilibrium
W ′n The expected time in system for non-
critical patients at ED in pooling equilib-
rium
cc Waiting cost rate for critical patients
cn Waiting cost rate for non-critical patients
Fig. 3: Preliminaries of the Model
Theorem 1. A separating equilibrium, in which predicted non-
critical patients go to UC and predicted critical patients go
to ED, is obtained if and only if
(1− pi)(P +R)− picn (Wn −W ) ≤ D
≤ pi′(P +R)− (1− pi′)cn (Wn −W ) .
(1)
Further if α + β ≤ 1 and Wn −W ≥ 0, then there exists a
D that satisfies both inequalities in (1).
The first inequality in Theorem 1 reflects the requirement
that patients self-triaged as non-critical go to the UC. The
second inequality reflects the requirement that the patients self-
triaged as critical go to the ED. The proofs of all theorems
and propositions in this paper are given in the Appendix.
Any discount D that satisfies the inequalities in Theorem 1
will result in a separating equilibrium. However, the UC ad-
ministration prefers lower discounts. Hence, the lower bound
is binding for the un-dominated separating equilibrium.
Corollary 2. The lowest discount, D∗, offered by a profit
maximizing UC is
D∗ = (1− pi)(P +R)− picn (Wn −W ) (2)
Intuitively, the corollary reflects the fact that only the first
inequality in Theorem 1 is binding. This sets the discount D
to be such that the patient triaged as non-critical is indifferent
between going to the UC and ED. The first term is the expected
penalty from rerouting the patients who are predicted non-
critical but are truly critical. The second term is the benefit
arising from a reduction in expected waiting cost of going to
an UC over an ED.
For tractability and ease of exposition, we assume that the
expected system times at the ED arise from an M/M/1 queuing
discipline with non-preemptive priority for critical patients.
Following (34) and using the arrival and service rates defined
above, the expected system waiting times are exhibited below.
Wc =
ρc/θ + ρn/ν
1− ρc +
1
θ
Wn =
ρc/θ + ρn/ν
(1− ρc)(1− ρc − ρn) +
1
ν
where ρn = λEn /ν, and ρc = λ
E
c /θ. Similarly, we assume
an M/M/1 queuing discipline for the UC. Then the expected
system waiting time in UC is exhibited below.
W =
1
µ− (1− α)λn (3)
We also assume that the ED is more congested than UC,
i.e., Wn ≥W .
B. Pooling Equilibrium
In this equilibrium, all the strategic patients go to the UC
first. They pay the co-pay and are triaged. Patients who are
triaged critical then go to the ED for treatment, incurring the
additional co-pay at the ED and the cost of re-routing. The
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care-map is shown in the bottom part of Figure 3. The flow
of patients to be treated in this equilibrium are:
Net flow rate of critical patients into ED: λ0c + λc
Net flow rate of non-critical patients into ED: λ0n
Net flow rate of non-critical patients into UC: λn.
With these flows, and again assuming that the expected sys-
tem times at the ED arise from an M/M/1 queuing discipline
with non-preemptive priority for critical patients, we get the
following expected system waiting times:
W ′c =
ρc/θ + ρ
′
n/ν
1− ρc +
1
θ
W ′n =
ρc/θ + ρ
′
n/ν
(1− ρc)(1− ρc − ρ′n)
+
1
ν
where ρ′n = λ0n/ν.
Similarly, we assume an M/M/1 queuing discipline for the
UC. Then the expected system waiting time in UC is exhibited
below.
W ′ =
1
µ− λn
We again assume that the ED is more congested than the
UC, i.e., Wn′ ≥ W ′. The UC manager sets the discount to
induce all strategic patients to go to the UC. This discount is
determined in the theorem below.
Theorem 3. A pooling equilibrium, in which all strategic
patients go to UC first, is obtained if and only if the discount
D′ is such that:
pi′(P +R)− (1− pi′)cn (W ′n −W ′) ≤ D′ (4)
A number of points are worth noting:
1) We show that the self-triage is informative. Since it is
also costless, the patients will perform the free self-triage
before deciding on course of action.
2) The condition that patients self-triaged as non-critical
preferring the UC over the ED is dominated by the
condition that patients self-triaged as critical also prefer
the UC over the ED.
3) The UC manager will pick the smallest discount possible
as that increases the profit. Hence, the discount, D′ will
be picked such that condition (4) is binding.
C. Comparing the Separating and Pooling Equilibria
The discount needed to get all strategic patients to go to the
UC is higher than that needed to get only those predicted to
be non-critical to go to the UC. Hence the discount needed
to obtain the pooling equilibrium is greater than that needed
to obtain the separating equilibrium. This is shown in the
proposition below.
Proposition 4. The discount needed to obtain the pooling
equilibrium in which all strategic patients prefer to go to the
UC, D′ is greater than the discount needed to obtain the
separating equilibrium in which the patients predicted non-
critical prefer to go to the UC, D∗.
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Fig. 4: Profits from the Equilibria
An UC center typically receives a payment from a third-
party, such as a health insurance company, for each patient
treated at the center. Let I be the payment per patient. This is
independent of the error rates α and β. With this payment, the
short-run profit for the UC center in each of the equilibrium
is shown below.
Profit in the separating equilibrium =
((1− α)λn + βλc) (P −D∗ + I)
Profit in the pooling equilibrium = (λn + λc) (P −D′+ I)
We note that the flow of patients is greater in the pooling
equilibrium but the revenue per patient is lower because of
the higher discount. The net effect is shown in the Figure 4
below.
In Figure 4 we note that for moderate error rates, the
separating equilibrium provides greater profit for the UC. In
the following sections we assume that the error rates are such
that the separating equilibrium is the one of interest.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DISCOUNT IN THE SEPARATING
EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we analyze the effect of error rates on
the discount offered by the UC manager in the separating
equilibrium in which all the patients self-triaged as non-critical
go to the UC. The two error rates are: Type I Error Rate (α)
which is the rate at which non-critical patients are classified
as critical; and the Type II Error Rate (β) which is the rate
at which the critical patients are classified as non-critical. We
re-state equation (2) highlighting the terms that are a function
of α and β.
D∗(α, β) = (1− pi(α, β)) (P +R)− pi(α, β)cn∆W (α)
(5)
where ∆W = Wn−W and pi = Pr[NC|NC ′] is the precision
of the non-critical classification.
The precision of non-critical classification pi(α, β) =
(1−α)(1−χ)
βχ+(1−α)(1−χ) is decreasing in both α and β. This is shown
in Figure 5 below. Since pi enters in with a negative sign in
Equation (5), the discount is increasing in both the error rates.
Now we turn to the effect of error rates on the ∆W term. It
is only affected by α, the rate at which a non-critical patient
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Fig. 5: Precision, Pr[NC|NC ′], vs. Type I and II Error Rates
mistakenly classifies herself as critical11. Increasing α results
in more non-critical patients ending up at the ED rather than
UC, effectively shifting traffic from the UC to the ED. In more
detail, the flow of strategic non-critical patients is split between
the ED at rate αλn and UC at the rate (1−α)λn. As the Type
I error rate α increases, the ED gets more congested, UC gets
less congested and the waiting time difference between the
two, ∆W increases. This is shown in Figure 6.
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Fig. 6: Expected System Times in ED and UC vs. Type I
Error Rate
Summing up the discussion above, β only affects the
precision and an increase in β results in a bigger discount.
In contrast, the net effect of an increase in α will depend on
the competing effects on the precision pi, and the waiting time
difference ∆W . When the ED is not too congested compared
to the UC, the slope of the difference in waiting time with
respect to traffic and α is not too large and the effect on pi
dominates. In this case the discount will be increasing in α.
However, if the ED is much more congested than the UC,
a transfer of a non-critical patient from the UC to the ED
because of Type I error will cause a much larger increase in
waiting time at ED and not much of decrease in waiting time
in the UC, i.e., the effect of α on ∆W will swamp out the
effect on pi and the discount may decrease with increasing α.
These results are formally presented in Proposition 5 below.
Proposition 5. The discount is increasing in R and β. If the
ED is not too congested so that
ρn
(1− ρn − ρc) (Wn +Wc) ≤
βχ(P +R)
cn(1− α)2 − λnW
2 (6)
then the discount is also increasing in α.
11The other error rate β, in which a critical patient classifies herself as
critical affects the discount only through the expected penalty of rerouting
and delays are not affected by it as after re-routing all critical patients end
up at the ED.
Proposition 5 is illustrated by the graphs below. We will
vary λ0c, the flow of non-strategic critical patients to vary the
amount of congestion at the ED. This is a good parameter to
vary the overall congestion of the ED as it affects all the delay
times without directly affecting other statistics. In Figure 7 we
show the critical level of λ0c for satisfying equation (6).
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Fig. 7: Critical Level of Non-Strategic Critical Patients
Traffic to Satisfy Proposition 5
The graphs of the optimal discount Vs. α are shown for
λ0c = 1, 2, 4 are shown in Figure 8. The condition (6) is
slack for values 1 and 2 and these instances we see that the
discount is increasing in α. For λ0c = 4, a value at which the
ED is too congested and condition 6 is violated, the discount
is decreasing in α.
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Fig. 8: Discount vs. Type I Error Rate and ED Congestion
The effect of Type II error rate β is shown in Figure 9. The
main effect of this error on the discount is via the penalty
term, which is increasing in β and the rerouting cost R.
So to achieve a lower discount UC administration can either
focus on reducing the Type II error rate or the rerouting cost.
Rerouting cost can be largely reduced by choosing the location
of UC closer to an ED. Nevertheless, UCs can reduce rerouting
costs in several ways. For instance, UC finishes the triage
eliminating the need for another triage in ED, calls ED and
assigns the required doctors to the patient and also transport
the patient to ED. On the other hand, UC can reduce β by
increasing the quality of CHI.
Finally, we combine the two effects by illustrating the
change in the regions in which separating equilibrium exists
for different discount values as a function of error rates in
Figure 10. As expected, as discount increases, separating
equilibrium exists for a larger set of error rate values. This
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is because as the discount increases, patients are more incen-
tivized to go to UC.
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V. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
We built a model of patient’s choice of acute care facility, an
Emergency Department or an Urgent Care center, that includes
not only the wait times and co-payment differences between
the facilities, but also the impact of errors in self-classification
and subsequent choice of the facility.
We showed that the errors in self-triage can have significant
impacts on the choice of an acute care facility by the patient,
the co-payment at an Urgent Care center, the capacity and
profits generated by an UC in the long run, and the social
welfare of all patients.
A reduction in Type I error rate, the error rate at which non-
critical patients classify themselves as critical, appropriately
increases the traffic at the UC by shifting more of the non-
critical patients to the UC, reduces the wait times at EDs
which are typically more congested than UCs, while modestly
increasing the waiting time at UCs. Overall, unless the ED is
less congested than the UC so that a shift of traffic because
of Type I error from the UC to the ED improves waiting
times through load balancing — a rare situation indeed, UC
can charge a higher co-pay, improve profits and capacity, and
ultimately the social welfare for all patients also increases as
this error rate decreases.
The effect of a reduction in Type II error rate, the error rate
at which a critical patient is self-classified as non-critical, is
more straight forward. A reduction in this error rate allows
for a critical patient to get more immediate care using the full
capabilities of the ED. This improvement is then factored in
by the patient, and it allows the UC to charge a higher co-pay.
So generally, all the participants in the acute care system, the
patients, the ED, the UC are better off with lower error rates.
Since the decision is made by the patient in the field, two major
hindrances remain to reduce errors: One is that the decision is
made by the patient who is typically medically untrained and
the other is the lack of instrumentation to provide vital health
information. Both of these can be ameliorated with technology
and better practices.
First, the guidelines could be improved. A systematic study
of guidelines in different regions and the effect on error
rates may help in improving them. Second, medically trained
personnel could be involved earlier in the decision mak-
ing process. Indeed, some healthcare insurers provide phone
numbers with healthcare personnel standing by to help with
this decision. While this helps, they are still hindered by
lack of instrumentation which can provide important health
data. As an example of this hindrance, we note that blood
oxygen saturation is an important determinant for urgency of
care and yet most patients do not have easy and immediate
access to instruments that can measure this. But this situation
is changing. Modern health fitness devices are increasingly
able to perform non-invasive measurements in real time and
transmit them to the cloud for further analysis. These could be
used to dramatically reduce the error rates and improve social
welfare.
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